Adequate Breathing Space in a Poisonous Atmosphere: Balancing Freedom and Responsibility in the Open Society by Hunsaker, David M.
Duquesne Law Review 
Volume 16 Number 1 Article 7 
1977 
Adequate Breathing Space in a Poisonous Atmosphere: Balancing 
Freedom and Responsibility in the Open Society 
David M. Hunsaker 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
David M. Hunsaker, Adequate Breathing Space in a Poisonous Atmosphere: Balancing Freedom and 
Responsibility in the Open Society, 16 Duq. L. Rev. 9 (1977). 
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol16/iss1/7 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection. 
Adequate Breathing Space in a Poisonous
Atmosphere: Balancing Freedom and Responsibility
in the Open Society
David M. Hunsaker*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
IN TRODU CTION .......... ............................. 9
I. DEFAMATION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT ......... 11
A. Development of the Law of Defamation ....... 11
B. Purposes Served by the Law of Defamation ..... 12
C. The Application of First Amendment Theory
to the Law of Defamation .................... 16
II. PUBLIC INTEREST, PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS, AND
MEDIA SELF-CENSORSHIP ........................ 26
A. Media v. Non-Media Speakers .............. 26
B. Negligence and Self-Censorship ............... 30
C. Private Individuals and the Public Interest ...... 32
III. THE NECESSITY FOR BALANCING FREEDOM AND
R ESPONSIBILITY .... ...................... ..... 36
A. The Growing Issue of Press Credibility ....... 36
B. Press Credibility and the Central Meaning of the
First Am endm ent ........................... 40
CONCLUSION: FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY IN THE
O PEN SOCIETY ............ I ............ ...... 42
INTRODUCTION
News and truth, suggested journalist Walter Lippmann more
than fifty years ago, are not the same thing and should be clearly
distinguished. The function of news is to signal an event, while truth
brings to light the hidden facts and makes a picture of reality on
which men can act; only where social conditions take recognizable
and measureable shape do news and truth coincide.' However valid
* B.A., University of California (1966); J.D., Columbia University (1969); M.A., Bradley
University (1972); LL.M., University of Virginia (1977); Member, California, D.C., Federal
Communications Bars.
1. W. LIPPMANN, PUBLIC OPINION 226 (Free Press ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as LIpPMAN].
Duquesne Law Review
this hypothesis may be, the press, as well as the public, usually
believes the information disseminated by the news media to be the
truth.2 Nevertheless, the credibility of the media is quickly ques-
tioned when a report proves to be false, and the general reader, even
though misled by a false report, has no legal remedy. ' Only the
object of the report can bring suit-an action for defamation. Spe-
cifically, the action can be maintained for libel if the report was
written,4 or slander if the statement was oral.5 In the last decade,
the Supreme Court has substantially changed the common law of
libel and slander in an effort to balance the rights of the press with
an individual's interest in protecting his reputation and privacy.
Perceiving a "national committment" to the "robust and wide-
open" debate of public issues, the Court has favored the communi-
cations media in constructing this balance.' Effective deliberation
of the issues requires "breathing space." 7 But the degree of constitu-
tional protection which should be afforded defamatory falsehoods
has yet to be resolved. This article will: (1) examine the current
balance, hesitantly arrived at by an "evanescent majority" of the
Supreme Court,8 between the competing values of defamation and
the first amendment; (2) explore three issues of workability under
the balance which relate particularly to first amendment problems;
and (3) propose a theory of first amendment-defamation interrela-
tionships which has not yet been explored, and which suggests that
further federal limitation of the state's power to protect its citizens
from defamatory falsehoods is likely to counteract the first amend-
ment values the Supreme Court has tried to promote.
2. "Indeed, newsmen now almost invariably depict themselves not merely as reporters of
the fragments of information that come their way, but as active pursuers of the truth ....
In the post-Watergate era, moreover, even critics of the press attribute to it powers of discov-
ery that go well beyond reporting new developments." Epstein, The American Press: Some
Truths About Truths, reprinted in ETmICS AND THE PRESS: READINGS IN MASS MEDIA MORALrry
60-61 (J. Merrill & R. Barney eds. 1975) [hereinafter cited as ETmIcs AND THE PRESS].
3. LIPPMAN, supra note 1, at 209.
4. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 111, at 737 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter
cited as PROSSER].
5. Id.
6. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
7. Id. at 272. See also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
8. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 380 (1974) (White, J., dissenting). See also
Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEx. L. Rav. 422, 459 n.183 (1975).
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I. DEFAMATION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. Development of the Law of Defamation
The law of defamation has evolved to serve several distinct pur-
poses. The early Anglo-Saxon kings punished slander in local secu-
lar courts not only to remedy the dishonor and personal insult it
caused, but also to preserve the peace by eliminating personal ven-
dettas.' After the Norman invasion and the separation of ecclesiasti-
cal and secular jurisdictions, and until the late sixteenth century,
slander became the province of the ecclesiastical courts." Since the
church courts relied on public knowledge of crimes and public accu-
sations to maintain order, the perjurer and false accuser posed a
threat to the fair and effective administration of ecclesiastical jus-
tice." Thus, slander was readily punished and the defamation.suit
soon became a popular vehicle for vindication and self-defense, fol-
lowing most secular trials which ended in acquittal. 2
During the reign of Elizabeth I, the common law lawyers, aware
of the popularity of the slander action in the ecclesiastical courts,
began to pursue defamation actions." By 1650, the popularity of the
9. Jones, "Actions for Slaunder"-Defamation in English Law, Language, and History,
57 Q. J. OF SPEECH 274-75 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Jones]. "A society not far removed
from self-help and the blood-feud, which it sought to replace with the rule of law and the
commutation of felonies, did not tolerate mischief that was often the cause of bitter and
bloody vendettas." Id. See also 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD 1 537 (2d. ed. 1899) [hereinafter cited as 2 F. POLLOCK & F.
MAITLAND].
10. See the writ Circumspecte agatis and the statute Articuli cleri in 1 STATUTES OF THE
REALM 101, 171 (1810). Jones notes that "[t]he only positive interest of the crown in this
area of the law was expressed in 1275 in the statute de scandalum magnatum, which was
reenacted in the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries, and which threatened punishment of
persons circulating seditious stories that provoked discord between the king and the nota-
bles." Jones, supra note 9, at 275.
11. Jones, supra note 9, at 275.
12. See, e.g., B. WOODCOCK, MEDIEVAL ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS IN THE DIOCESE OF
CANTERBURY 88-89 (1952); 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 9, at 538. Both the church
and secular courts, which shared jurisdiction over defamation without apparent distinction,
exacted penalties from the defendant. Jones, supra note 9, at 278. Besides pennance, the
usual ecclesiastical form of punishment, the church courts exacted amercement, which could
take the form of damages for the specific injury (detrimentum) and compensation for the
insult (dedignacionem). The penalties imposed in the local secular courts also distinguished
between dishonor or public shame and specific temporal loss. Id. See also F. MAITLAND & G.
BAILDON, THE COURT BARON 27, 40, 48 (1891).
13. The first treatise on the common law of defamation was John March's ACTIONS FOR
SLAUNDER, published in 1647, which distinguished between defamatory words which were
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action in common law courts was so great that judges imposed rules
of interpretation and limitations, often quite arbitrarily, in an at-
tempt to lighten the dockets."
Libel arose within a different institutional framework. The erup-
tion of religious and constitutional controversy in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries increased official concern over sedition, polit-
ical dissent, and particularly the influential role of the press in
promoting these ideas. To suppress the flow of harmful information,
the charge of libel was more easily proven and covered a broader
range of falsehoods than common law slander.'" Words never consid-
ered to be defamatory when spoken were libelous and criminal when
published. A libel defendant even lacked the safeguard against an
unjust verdict assured by common law slander: truth, an absolute
defense in slander, was not admissible in libel. Furthermore, mali-
cious intent was assumed in libel rather than an issue to be proved
as in slander. Until 1800, the only issue for the jury in libel was the
fact of publication."
Thus, we owe our present confusing and often unjust rules of
defamation to a mixture of historical forces and political objectives
evolving through the middle ages to the eighteenth century.
B. Purposes Served by the Law of Defamation
The function of the law of defamation like the function of all tort
law is primarily to compensate for injury. Unlike torts that seek to
protect a person's physical condition, defamation compensates in-
jury to the plaintiff's relational interests." These interests form the
basis of human society and its institutions and are, therefore, highly
valued and merit state protection.'"
actionable per se, and those which required proof of special damages. Jones, supra note 9, at
279.
14. Plucknett cites the epitome of scholastic (and in this case, literal) hairsplitting. The
statement, "Sir Thomas Holt struck his cook on the head with a cleaver, and cleaved his
head; the one part lay on one shoulder and the other part on the other" was held not to be
actionable because the slanderer had never accused the plaintiff of actually killing his cook.
T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 495 (5th ed. 1956).
15. The law of libel did not begin to coalesce with the common law of defamation until
well into the 18th century, and integration was never complete. See PROSSER, supra note 4,
§ 112 at 751-52.
16. Jones, supra note 9, at 282. Jones notes that the royal courts, which only begrudgingly
punished slander, rushed to chastise the courts' critics to preserve its untarnished image. Id.
17. See Green, Relational Interests, 31 ILL. L. REv. 35 (1936).
18. By way of analogy, the late Wolfgang Friedman once observed that the extending or
Vol. 16: 9
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Since the courts are protecting an individual's relationships with
others, the public nature of the tort-publication of the defamatory
statement-has always been an element of the plaintiff's case. Simi-
larly, the action is not viable without proving or presuming injury
to the plaintiff's reputation.'9
By protecting relational interests, the law of defamation has the
collateral effect of encouraging citizens to seek public office and
become active in civic and community life. 0 For example, a pro-
spective candidate knows that he has a legal remedy to defamatory
campaign muckraking. Thus, extreme fortitude in the face of false-
hoods and malicious rumors is not the only, nor the most important,
qualification for public office or community leadership.2'
Vindicating the victim of a "published" falsehood has been fre-
quently cited as an objective of defamation law equal in importance
to compensation. 2 When a statement is determined to be defama-
withholding of international "relations" to a new state such as Biafra, by other nations, could
well determine the survival of that state as a sovereign entity. Freedom of association is, of
course, a form of communication, and a right firmly protected by the first amendment.
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). But no court has ever articulated the first amend-
ment interest in free association as a basis for allowing recovery for its restriction due to
defamatory falsehoods. "State action" is not directly involved in the restriction, to be sure,
but neither is it involved in private acts of discrimination which Congress has seen fit to
regulate with the approval of the Supreme Court. See Hearings on S. 1732 Before the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, 88th Cong., 1st sess. pts. 1 & 2; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000a-6 (1970).
19. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 111 at 737, § 112 at 761. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 350 (1974), the Court, in limiting recovery for negligent defamations to "actual
injury," stated that customary types of actual harm included impairment of reputation and
standing in the community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering. In
Time, Inc., v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), the Court suggested that given permissive state
law, humiliation and mental anguish may be recovered in the absence of any proof or asser-
tion of harm to reputation. For criticism of this result, see Eaton, The American Law of
Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA.
L. REv. 1349, 1437-39 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Eaton].
20. See Post Publishing Co. v. Hallam, 59 F. 530 (6th Cir. 1893). As Chief Justice Burger
noted in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974):
[Tihe advocate is not to be invidiously identified with his client. The important
public policy which underlies this tradition-the right to counsel-would be gravely
jeopardized if every lawyer who takes an "unpopular" case, civil or criminal, would
automatically become fair game for irresponsible reporters and editors who might, for
example, describe the lawyer as a "mob mouthpiece" for representing a client with a
serious prior criminal record, or as an "ambulance chaser" for representing a claimant
in a personal injury action.
Id. at 355 (Burger, CA., dissenting).
21. But cf. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947) (Court stressed that the privilege of fair
comment will protect newspapers in most cases).
22. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 569, Comment b (1938); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S.
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tory on its face, and thus actionable per se, the plaintiff has been
entitled to nominal damages even if the jury concludes that no harm
to his reputation occurred.13 The costs of a lawsuit, however, are
likely to deter one whose main objective is to clarify the record,
rather than to seek compensation for his damaged reputation, un-
less there is a prospect of collecting punitive damages in addition
to nominal damages."' However, the Supreme Court's decision in
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 5 has effectively prevented individuals
defamed by the media from vindicating themselves. The Gertz deci-
sion abolished strict liability and presumed damages for per se defa-
mations by the media, and limited the recovery of punitive damages
to instances when the plaintiff can prove knowing or reckless publi-
cation of a falsehood.26
To the extent defamation law protects reputations, it also pro-
motes society's interest in privacy. At least one Supreme Court
Justice has suggested that the law of libel protects the individual's
personality from unwarranted intrusion.27 A person's reputation can
be damaged by true facts; absent a legitimate public concern, there-
fore, the publication of true facts about an ordinary citizen's private
life should be actionable whether or not the plaintiff can prove
actual damages to reputation. 2 The desire here is to shield true, but
highly personal, facts from the community at large. This interest,
however, is unprotected by libel law, which recognizes truth as an
75, 93 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring); Note, Vindication of the Reputation of a Public
Official, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1730 (1967).
23. RESTATEMENT OF Toars § 569, Comment c (1938).
24. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Pegler, 223 F.2d 429 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 846 (1955);
Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1049 (1970).
25. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
26. Id. at 347-50. See notes 103-23 and accompanying text infra.
27. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 48 (1971) (Brennan, J.). The plurality
opinion was concurred in by the Chief Justice and Justice Blackmun. In Rosenblatt v. Baer,
383 U.S. 75 (1966), Justice Stewart observed that "[tihe protection of private personality,
like the protection of life itself, is left primarily to the individual States under the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments. But this does not mean that the right is entitled to any less recognition
by this Court as a basic of our constitutional system." Id. at 92 (Stewart, J., concurring).
28. See Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. Rlv. 193 (1890). The most
celebrated case was Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931), where a motion
picture revealed the past history and present identity of a reformed prostitute who had been
a defendant in a murder trial seven years previously. There is some speculation whether that
case or any "public disclosure of private facts" case would be decided in favor of the plaintiff
after Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). There is no longer any doubt that a plaintiff
has no right to prevent the publication of matters of public record. Cox Broadcasting Corp.
v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
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absolute defense, and is protected, if at all, by an action for invasion
of privacy. 9
Finally, an action for defamation at least partially ensures that
only truthful information is disseminated. 0 Since first amendment
goals are not furthered by false information,3 restricting the flow of
such information is permissible and beneficial. If undeterred, false-
hood may inhibit debate 3 and the democratic goals discussion is
designed to serve.3 "Surely, if the 1950's taught us anything," wrote
Justice Stewart, "they taught us that the poisonous atmosphere of
the easy lie can infect and degrade a whole society."34 Liability for
defamatory falsehoods encourages a publisher 35 . to investigate and
ascertain the truth of potentially harmful statements before dissem-
inating them.3 ' To perform its decision-making functions in a de-
mocracy, the public must not only have accurate and complete
information, it must also have faith in the credibility of its informa-
29. Cf Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971). See also Nimmer,
The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and
Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 935 (1968); Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the
First Amendment: Hill, Butts and Walker, 1967 Sup. CT. REv. 267.
30. See Eaton, supra note 19, at 1358.
31. "Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially advance society's interest
in 'uninhibited, robust and wide-open' debate on public issues." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
32. "It is not at all inconceivable that virtually unrestrained defamatory remarks about
private citizens will discourage them from speaking out and concerning themselves with social
problems." Id. at 400 (White, J., dissenting).
33. See Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Fair Game and Fair Comment I, 42
COLUM. L. REv. 1085, 1088-90 (1942).
34. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 94 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring).
As Eric Sevareid pointed out some years ago, when journalists confined their coverage
of the late Senator Joseph McCarthy simply to what the senator said and did, far from
producing objective journalism they were producing "the big lie." For the truth or the
meaning of McCarthy could never be discerned from any particular statement he made
or act he performed. It could only be discerned by relating the particular action to
previous, possibly contradictory, actions; to the web of current and contemporary
history in which the actions took place; and to known realities which the senator had
ignored or misstated but which were relevant if readers were to be able to understand
the senator and to form a judgment about his responsibility.
McDonald, Is Objectivity Possible?, 4 THE CENTER MAGAZINE 29 (Sept. 1971), reprinted in
ETHICS AND THE PRESS, supra note 2, at 81. [hereinafter cited as McDonald]. See notes 155-
92 and accompanying text infra.
35. "Publisher" is used here in the broad sense of one who makes information publicly
known, regardless of the medium.
36. Underlying this policy is also the traditional presumption of innocence and a corre-
sponding burden on the accuser to prove the truth of the charges against the accused.
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tion sources, if it is expected to use them." Some form of account-
ability is essential, therefore, to justify and maintain that faith.
Thus, the law of defamation serves an impressive array of vital
social interests. Its objectives center around compensating injuries
to relations that are fundamental to, and definitional of, human
society. In addition, defamation law directly or indirectly serves
public tranquility, self-defense, privacy, and effective public and
community leadership; it also deters the spread of false information
and maintains source credibility. Surprisingly, despite the quirks,
arbitrary distinctions, and unjust applications of the law of defama-
tion, it has served these interests fairly well. Nonetheless, defama-
tion law needed revamping, and by 1964 the change was long over-
due.
C. The Application of First Amendment Theory to the Law
of Defamation
In 1964, the Supreme Court first indicated what impact the con-
stitutional right to free speech had on the law of defamation. The
Court, in New York Times v. Sullivan,"5 constitutionalized the com-
mon law privileges of fair comment and honest mistake of fact,39 and
ruled that traditional state libel law must give way to the first
amendment:
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal
rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for
a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless
he proves that the statement was made with "actual mal-
ice"-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not.4"
In the Court's view, the "central meaning" of the first amend-
ment mandated this standard.' The framers, argued the Court,
were primarily concerned with avoiding a tradition of seditious libel
which had severely restrained freedom of the press in England. The
37. See, e.g., Isaacs, The New Credibility Gap-Readers vs. the Press, AM. Soc'Y OF
NEWSPAPER EDITORs BULL. 1 (Feb. 1969).
38. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
39. Id. at 279-80.
40. Id. With the exception of the Court's redefinition of "actual malice," the conditional
privilege of fair comment and honest misstatement of fact were both recognized in some
jurisdictions. See Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908).
41. 376 U.S. at 273. See Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central
Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191 [hereinafter cited as Kalven].
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Court concluded that the American Sedition Act of 1798 had been
judged invalid under the first amendment by the "court of history"
because it imposed an intolerable restraint upon criticism of public
officials. 2 As with criminal libels of the government, libels of public
officials, if readily punished, could be used to vindicate government
policy and silence criticism.43 As demonstrated by this country's
experience with the Alien and Sedition Acts from 1798 to 1801, the
defense of truth,4 or even substantial truth, was no guarantee that
a defendant engaging in honest criticism would prevail. The New
York Times Court reasoned that what a state could not constitu-
tionally bring about by means of a criminal statute was likewise
beyond the reach of its civil law of libel." It feared that even if a
newspaper could absorb the losses from a series of adverse libel
judgments, a chilling effect would result, producing self-censorship.
While the Court did not state that the first amendment protected
dissemination of false facts, it suggested that erroneous statements
are inevitable if there is to be uninhibited, wide-open, and robust
debate on public issues." To avoid press self-censorship, the line
must be drawn so as to provide adequate "breathing space" for the
fruitful exercise of first amendment freedoms.4 7
42. 376 U.S. at 275. At least one noted jurist, Joseph Story, disagreed that the Sedition
Act was universally condemned:
It is notorious, that some of the ablest statesmen and jurists of America, at the time
of the passage of these [Alien and Sedition] acts, and ever since, have maintained
the constitutionality of these laws . . . . [T]he most serious doubts may be enter-
tained, whether even in the present day, a majority of constitutional lawyers, or of
judicial opinions, deliberately hold them to be unconstitutional.
3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1289, at 167 n.2 [hereinafter cited as
STORY].
43. "No one can doubt the importance, in a free government, of a right to canvass the
acts of public men, and the tendency of public measures, to censure boldly the conduct of
rulers and to scrutinize closely the policy, and plans of the government. This is the great
security of a free government." STORY, supra note 42, § 1882 at 741.
44. Unlike the 17th century English libel law, truth was a defense under the American
Sedition Act.
45. 376 U.S. at 277. Justice Story also recognized that, practically speaking, a civil award
of damages could restrain just as much as a public fine. But he argued that "monstrous
consequences" would flow from such a doctrine. "It would prostrate all personal liberty, all
private peace, all enjoyment of property, and good reputation." STORY, supra note 42, § 1882
at 740-41.
46. In a footnote, Justice Brennan advanced the proposition that "[e]ven a false state-
ment may be deemed to make a valuable contribution to public debate, since it brings about
'the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error'
.
.376 U.S. at 279 n.19.
47. Id. at 271-72.
1977-78
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In Garrison v. Louisiana,"8 the Court logically extended the Times
rule to criminal prosecutions for libel and held that truth was an
absolute defense to libel. Questions remained, however, as to the
extent of the constitutional privilege. Did the rule apply to non-
media speakers? Did it apply to candidates for public office as well
as incumbents in office? Were all public officials, no matter how
menial their duties, within the rule? What were the boundaries of
"official conduct"? The Court needed to answer these and many
other questions in light of the "central meaning" theory of the first
amendment it had announced, and several issues were addressed in
subsequent cases.
The Court suggested that the term "public official" applied to
those among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or
appear to the public to have, "substantial responsibility for or con-
trol over the conduct of government affairs."4 The appearance of
substantial responsibility, however, did not mean that the press
could create a Times public official simply by giving extensive cov-
erage to him; such n interpretation would disregard society's inter-
est in protecting reputation.'" In Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy,' the
Court held that a candidate, whether classified as a public official
or a public figure, was clearly within the Times rule and the first
amendment theory articulated in that decision. More important,
the Roy case further defined what constituted "relating to official
conduct," stating that an allegation of criminal conduct, no matter
how remote in time or place, must always be considered relevant to
an official's or a candidate's fitness for public office."2
48. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
49. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966).
50. That interpretation, said the Court, "would virtually disregard society's interest in
protecting reputation. The employee's position must be one which would invite public scru-
tiny and discussion of the person holding it, entirely apart from the scrutiny and discussion
occasioned by the particular charges in the controversy." Id. at 86-87 n.13.
Eaton observes that the distinction between "the scrutiny of the position occupied and
scrutiny occasioned by the particular charges in controversy has been all but ignored" by
the lower courts. Eaton, supra note 19, at 1377.
51. 401 U.S. 265 (1971).
52. Id. at 277. A newspaper columnist had charged that the plaintiff had been a "small-
time bootlegger" during Prohibition. In Garrison, the Court had previously ruled that
"anything which might touch on an official's fitness for office is relevant," regardless of the
effect on his private reputation. 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964).
It was unclear whether the New York Times Court intended to shift the burden of proving
falsity to the plaintiff. While nothing in Times suggested that proof of falsity was part of the
plaintiff's prima facie case, that was implied in subsequent cases. For example, in Garrison
v. Louisiana, Justice Brennan stated: "We held in New York Times that a public official
might be allowed the civil remedy only if he establishes that the utterance was false and that
Vol. 16: 9
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The Court had been unclear on whether the Times privilege bene-
fitted the news media only. The defamatory article in the Times
case was a newspaper advertisement paid for by the defendant civil
rights leaders; but, in stating that the character of the article was
unimportant, the Court was responding to the issue of the first
amendment protection of commercial and non-commercial speech,
rather than whether the privilege applied to non-media speakers)'
Despite contrary assertions by Justice Stewart, 4 nothing in the New
York Times decision suggests separate or superior rights inherent in
freedom of the press as distinguished from freedom of speech.
Given the broad purpose of encouraging uninhibited debate,
which the Supreme Court attributed to the first amendment, ex-
pansion of the Times rule seemed inevitable."5 The extension was
anticipated by lower courts which applied the rule to plaintiffs who
had projected themselves into "the arena of public policy, public
controversy, and 'pressing public concern.' "I'
In 1967, the Supreme Court extended the Times rule to public
it was made with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of whether it was false or
true." 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964). See also Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 84 (1966); Greenbelt
Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 8 (1970); Arkin & Granquist, The Presumption
of General Damages in the Law of Constitutional Libel, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1482, 1482 n.5
(1968). But see Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), where Justice White,
writing for the Court, stated that "the prevailing view is that truth is a defense." Id. at 489-
90. (emphasis added).
Eaton argues, however, that restatements of the Times ruling are loose characterizations
of the privilege and do not indicate where the burden of proving falsity must lie. Eaton, supra
note 19, at 1383-84. "In addition, there would seem to be some serious illogic in a procedure
which allows a defamation defendant to establish in his defense a privilege designed to protect
false speech, which has the effect of requiring the plaintiff-after the privilege is estab-
lished-to prove the speech false. If the plaintiff then proves the speech false he has accom-
plished absolutely nothing. ... Id. at 1385-86.
53. 376 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1964). The Court did say that the "paid advertisement" was an
important outlet for non-media speakers who otherwise had no means of access to the public.
The Court seemed to be concerned more with not inhibiting access to the press, rather than
in fashioning a different rule concerning non-media speakers.
54. Stewart, The Role and Rights of the Press, Washington Post, Nov. 11, 1974 at A-20
[hereinafter cited as Stewart]; also reprinted as, The Free Press: The Great American Risk,
2 BARRISTER 17 (Spring 1975), and as Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975). Justice
Stewart's view is that the freedom of the press clause was intended to create a "fourth branch
of government," the institutionalized press, as a check on the other three branches. See notes
103-23 and accompanying text infra.
55. "[Tlhe invitation to follow a dialectic progression from public officials to government
policy to public policy to matters in the public domain. seems to me to be overwhelming."
Kalven, supra note 41, at 221.
56. Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., 362 F.2d 188, 197 (8th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 388 U.S. 909 (1967).
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figures in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts.5" The Butts Court held
that the Times standard, requiring proof of actual malice, applied
to plaintiffs who were not public officials, but who had attracted
public attention either through the positions they held in society or
their activities in affairs of public concern.
Since "public figure" was not a new concept in the law of torts,
various definitions of the term existed, particularly as it related to
a privileged invasion of privacy." At common law, a public figure
was defined as a person who, by his accomplishments or by adopting
a profession, gave the public a legitimate interest in his doings,' 9
even though he had not sought publicity or public attention.'"
This definition encompassed a wide range of personalities. In
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,' Justice Harlan, utilizing these
traditional tort principles, found that both a college football coach
and a retired army officer were public figures under the New York
Times standard. While Butts was a public figure solely by his posi-
tion as a coach at a major college, Walker became one by his pur-
poseful activity in a civil rights demonstration which thrust him
into the vortex of an important public controversy.2
In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Warren's definition was
phrased somewhat differently: public figures are those individuals
57. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). Justice Harlan, in an opinion concurred in by Clark, Stewart,
and Fortas, affirming a judgment against the Saturday Evening Post for falsely reporting that
University of Georgia football coach Wally Butts had fixed a game between Georgia and
Alabama, argued that a negligence standard was sufficient protection for the first amend-
ment interest in debate on public issues when that debate involved public figures rather than
government officials. Chief Justice Warren, while concurring in the judgment, believed that
the Times "actual malice" standard should apply, but found it to have been met in the Butts
case. Id. at 162. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice White, agreed with the Chief Justice that
the Times rule should apply, but dissented from the judgment affirming Butts because they
did not believe that the standards had been properly presented to the jury. Id. at 172. Justices
Black and Douglas dissented from the judgment, arguing that the first amendment gave full
press immunity "from the harassment of libel judgments." Id. The Court was unanimous in
reversing a libel judgment against Associated Press in the companion Walker case. In an-
nouncing the Walker judgment, Justice Harlan noted that the New York Times standard,
rather than the negligence standard, would apply on remand, since Justices Black and Doug-
las had joined the three Times adherents for that purpose. Id at 146-55.
58. See Note, Right of Privacy vs. Free Press: Suggested Resolution of Conflicting Values,
28 IND. L.J. 179 (1958).
59. PRossEa, supra note 4, § 118 at 823.
60. Id. at 825. See also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 867, Comment f. The privilege has been
extended to public disclosure of private facts and in many jurisdictions, non-defamatory
"false light" invasions of privacy.
61. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
62. Id. at 155.
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who are "intimately involved in the resolution of important public
questions or, by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of con-
cern to society at large. 6
3
As the definitions differed, so did the reasons for including public
figures under the Times rubric. The justification which most clearly
compliments the Times first amendment theory is that advanced by
Chief Justice Warren. He believed that public figures are semi-
public officials because they have the power to influence the resolu-
tion of public issues: since some governmental power has shifted to
the public sector in the form of committees, corporations, and asso-
ciations, many who do not hold public office are in a position to
influence important public issues. 4 Citizen interest in such persons
is therefore legitimate and substantial, and freedom to engage in
robust debate over their role in public issues and events is as impor-
tant as the concern for the activities of public officials. Discussion
about public figures is particularly crucial, Warren thought, be-
cause, unlike public officials, public figures are not restrained by the
political process; public opinion, expressed by and through the
media, "may be the only method by which society can attempt to
influence their conduct." 5
The late Chief Justice would classify a public figure according to
the degree of power and influence over the decision-making process
the individual possessed. Certainly, one measure of this influence
would be the extent to which such persons have access to the mass
media, "both to influence policy and to counter criticism of their
63. Id. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
64. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 163-64 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring).
Increasingly in this country, the distinctions between governmental and private sectors
are blurred. Since the depression of the 1930's and World War II there has been a rapid
fusion of economic and political power, a merging of science, industry, and govern-
ment, and a high degree of interaction between the intellectual, governmental, and
business worlds . . . . [Plower has also become much more organized in what we
have commonly considered to be the private sector. In many situations, policy determi-
nations which traditionally were channeled through formal political institutions are
now originated and implemented through a complex array of boards, committees,
commissions, corporations, and associations, some only loosely connected with the
Government. This blending of positions and power has also occurred in the case of
individuals so that many who do not hold public office at the moment are nevertheless
intimately involved in the resolution of important public questions or, by reason of
their fame, shape events in areas of concern to society at large.
Id.
65. Id. at 164.
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views and activities."" Other Court members, however, in justifying
the extension of the New York Times standard within the central
meaning of the first amendment, viewed media access as the focal
point. Justice Harlan thought the epistemological premise underly-
ing the national commitment to wide-open debate was that "speech
can rebut speech, propaganda will answer propaganda," and.the
result will closely approximate the "truth" and wiser governmental
policies. "7 Thus, the preferred remedy for false speech is more
speech. " One who has access to the media can expose the fallacies
of the defamatory statements,"9 and has less need of the state's
protection. Presumably, under this rationale, as long as an individ-
ual had access to the media to answer defamatory charges against
him, he could be held to the Times or comparable standard70 of
proving fault on the part of the defendant, regardless of whether the
plaintiff held the power to affect public issues.
The access rationale has been criticized by commentators7 as well
as by members of the Court. Justice Brennan, who concurred with
Chief Justice Warren's definition of public figures in Butts,72 re-
jected the argument as a means of distinguishing between public
figures and private individuals: even the public figure who can com-
mand the attention of the media cannot vindicate his reputation
after a damaging charge has been made against him. Although he
can publicly deny the charge, a denial would be ineffective since it
would not receive the prominent coverage of the original story.7 3
66. Id.
67. Id. at 153.
68. The source of this "marketplace" theory is usually considered to be Thomas Jefferson,
who stated in his First Inaugural: "If there be any among us who would wish to dissolve this
Union, or to change its republican form, let them stand undisturbed as monuments of the
safety with which error of opinion may be tolerated, where reason is left free to combat it."
Reprinted in 7 THE WORLD'S BEST ORATIONs 2611, 2614 (D. Brewer ed. 1899).
69. 388 U.S. at 155.
70. Justice Harlan then favored a "reasonable and prudent publisher" standard to be
applied to public figures. See note 57 supra. His refusal to apply the more restrictive Times
standard was based on the facts that: (1) public figures, unlike public officials, had no
privilege against libel actions for their utterances, citing Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959);
(2) nor do they occupy positions "which would permit a recovery by [them] to be viewed as
a vindication of governmental policy"; and (3) actions against such persons cannot be analog-
ized to prosecutions for seditious libel. 388 U.S. at 153-54.
71. See Cohen, A New Niche for the Fault Principle: A Forthcoming Newsworthiness
Privilege in Libel Cases?, 18 U. CAL. L.A.L. REV. 371 (1970); Kalven, The Reasonable Man
and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and Walker, 1967 Sup. CT. REV. 267.
72. 388 U.S. at 172.
73. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 46-47 (1971) (Brennan, J.). Justice
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Assumption of the risk has become a third justification for includ-
ing public figures within the Times rule. A public figure, by volun-
tarily encountering public controversy," has arguably assumed the
risk of being defamed in the course of public debate." While as-
sumption of risk may be a useful doctrine for some purposes in tort
law,7" Justice Brennan considered its application to defamation to
be at best a legal fiction. More important, the assumption of risk
rationale seems unrelated to the first amendment objectives of pro-
moting free debate."
The definitions of public figures and justifications for including
them within the Times rule were blended in Justice Powell's major-
ity opinion in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc." where the Court refused
to extend the New York Times standard to individuals who were
Harlan, however, thought it "quite clear that the public person has a greater likelihood of
securing access to channels of communication sufficient to rebut falsehoods concerning him
than do private individuals in this country who do not toil in the public spotlight." Id. at 70
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
At the same time, Justice Brennan considered that right of reply and retraction statutes
would be the appropriate remedy for a private individual who had been defamed in the course
of discussion of public issues. Id. at 47 & n.15.
74. Cf. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967) (Harlan, J.).
75. According to the Gertz formulation, public figures "invite attention and comment,"
and "the communications media are entitled to act on the assumption that public officials
and public figures have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury from de-
famatory falsehood concerning them." 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974). Eaton considers this "the
underlying theory of the Court's grant of ample 'breathing space' to the media's coverage
of public figures and its insistance on traditional tort accountability for reasonably forseeable
injury to private individuals." Eaton, supra note 19, at 1420.
76. See PRossER, supra note 4, § 68. The doctrine has been criticized and its abolition
called for. See, e.g., 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, LAW OF TORTS § 21.1, at 1162-92 (1956); Payne,
Assumption of Risk and Negligence, 35 CAN. B. REv. 350 (1957); James, Assumption of Risk:
Unhappy Reincarnation, 78 YALE L.J. 185 (1968).
77. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 48 (1971). Justice Harlan, however,
continued to defend his position first announced in Butts:
[Olur willingness to assume that public personalities are more impervious to criti-
cism, and may be held to have run the risk of publicly circulated falsehoods concerning
them, does not rest solely upon an empirical assertion of fact, but also upon a belief
that, in our political system, the individual speaker is entitled to act upon such an
assumption if our institutions are to be held up, as they should be, to constant scrutiny.
Id. at 70-71 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
78. The assumption of risk doctrine might deter private persons from seeking any access
to the media in order to discuss public issues for fear that such voluntary exposure might
transubstantiate them into public figures who have assumed the risk of defamation. Indeed,
Justice Brennan argues that "the private individual often desires press exposure either for
himself, his ideas, or his causes," which "Constitutional adjudication must take into account
.. ." Id. at 47 n.15.
79. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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neither public officials nor public figures. Justice Powell acknowl-
edged that some people might be cast into the public spotlight
through no purposeful action of their own, but he thought such cases
were exceedingly rare. Public figures are. those who are especially
prominent in society, and thereby "invite attention and com-
ment." 0 Thus, public figure statusimay be accorded to (1) those
persons who by (a) occupying positions of "persuasive power and
influence," 8' (b) their "pervasive involvement in the affairs of so-
ciety," 2 or (c) the "notoriety of their achievements," 3 have ac-
quired such "general fame or notoriety in the community 84 that
they are "deemed public figures for all purposes" 5 and "in all con-
texts,"" ' or (2) more commonly, to those persons who "have thrust
themselves to the forefront of' particular public controversies in
order to influence the resolution of the issues involved," 87 and
thereby become public figures "for a limited range of issues." 8 In
this latter, and more common category, an individual's status turns
on "the nature and extent of. . . [his] participation in the particu-
lar controversy giving rise to the defamation."89 The Gertz Court
also clarified the first amendment values supporting the extension
of the Times standard to public figures. Chief Justice Warren's
''power" rationale was stressed in articulating the role of the public
person in society. 0 The voluntary nature of the individual's activi-
ties was also stressed, indicating the assumption of risk analogy."
Access to the media, while recognized as usually more available to
public officials and public figures, was downplayed as a constitu-
80. Id. at 345.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 352.
83. Id. at 342.
84. Id. at 351-52.
85. Id. at 345.
86. Id. at 351.
87. Id. at 345.
88. Id. at 351.
89. Id. at 352. The Court considered as probative the fact that plaintiff, a Chicago attor-
ney, (a) played a minimal role in the public controversy surrounding the prosecution of a
police officer for manslaughter, (b) never discussed the issue in any context with the press
and was never quoted as having done so, and (c) while operating as a civil advocate did not
engage the public's attention in an attempt to influence the resolution of the "police brutal-
ity" issue. Id.
90. See id. at 345, 352.
91. See note 75 supra.
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tional justification for the application of the Times rule.2 Given the
"absolutist" ruling in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,"
decided the same day as Gertz, that the Constitution prohibits any
"right-of-access" statutes, the deprecation of the "access" rationale
and of the "marketplace" view of the first amendment 9 may have
been necessary to avoid the appearance of contradictory decisions."
While the dissenters and commentators warned that the Gertz
majority was "evanescent," 6 the public figure/private individual
distinction was not only reaffirmed in the 1976 decision Time, Inc.
v. Firestone,7 but the theory gained an additional adherent.9" Jus-
tice Rehnquist, writing for a majority of the Court, believed that
Mary Alice Firestone, former wife of the scion of one of America's
wealthier industrial families, was not a public figure under the
Gertz formulation because she: (1) did not voluntarily become in-
volved in a public controversy, (2) did not choose to publicize ques-
tions concerning the propriety of her marriage, (3) was not promi-
nent in the resolution of public questions, and (4) did not use her
access to the media to influence the outcome of the divorce proceed-
ings, nor "as a vehicle by which to thrust herself to the forefront of
some unrelated controversy in order to influence its resolution."99
92. See 418 U.S. at 344. "Of course, an opportunity for rebuttal seldom suffices to undo
harm of defamatory falsehood. Indeed, the law of defamation is rooted in our experience that
the truth rarely catches up with a lie. But the fact that the self-help remedy of rebuttal,
standing alone, is inadequate to its task does not mean that it is irrelevant to our inquiry."
Id. at 344 n.9.
93. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
94. I have argued elsewhere that the marketplace theory of the first amendment required
a different result in Miami Herald. Hunsaker, The Print Media and Equal Time, FREEDOM
OF INFORMATION CENTER REPORT No. 0016 (April, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Hunsaker].
95. Justice White sensed the incongruity:
To me it is a near absurdity to so deprecate individual dignity, as the Court does in
Gertz, and to leave the people at the complete mercy of the press, at least in this stage
of our history when the press, as the majority in this case so well documents, is steadily
becoming more powerful and much less likely to be deterred by threats of libel suits.
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241, 263 (1974) (White, J., concurring).
96. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
97. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
98. Chief Justice Burger, who had dissented in Gertz, implying that he agreed with much
of Justice White's dissent, 418 U.S. 323, 354-55 (1974), joined in the majority opinion written
by Justice Rehnquist. Justice Marshall, who had been a member of the Gertz majority,
dissented in Firestone as to the application of the Gertz rule in the particular case, rather
than to its continuing validity. 424 U.S. at 484. Justice Blackmun, who was a "reluctant"
member of the Gertz majority, offered no hesitation in Firestone. Justices Brennan and White
dissented for reasons completely opposite to their reasons for dissenting in Gertz. 424 U.S. at
471, 481. Justice Stevens took no part in the case.
99. 424 U.S. at 453-55 (1976).
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Firestone indicates that the Supreme Court has adopted both the
power and influence and the assumption of risk rationales. The
Court also decided that access to the press,"" without attempting
to influence the outcome of a public controversy,'0' is not a crucial
factor in determining whether the plaintiff is a public figure; the
Court was apparently determined to prevent expansion of the Times
standard to any plaintiff who had access to the media. Several
issues relating to the workability of the new standards, however,
remain unclear.
II. PUBLIC INTEREST, PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS, AND MEDIA SELF-
CENSORSHIP
The rationale and workability of the Gertz formula has received
considerable criticism in the past two years'012 and this article will
not engage in another exhaustive analysis. Because the following
'three issues directly relate to first amendment theory, however, they
merit discussion: (1) whether a distinction between media and non-
media defendants is justified; (2) whether a negligence standard for
defamation of private individuals is a workable balance; and (3)
whether first amendment values might be better served by a public
interest, rather than a public figure formulation.
A. Media v. Non-Media Speakers
Considerable evidence supports the assumption that the Gertz
Court limited the application of its new rules to media defendants.
Gertz consistently refers to publishers and broadcasters, 3 media
100. Mrs. Firestone held several press conferences during the divorce proceedings. Justice
Marshall considered this fact dispositive of the issue of whether she was a public figure. 424
U.S. at 485 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
101. Despite extensive coverage of the trial by two Miami papers, the Court held that
"[djissolution of a marriage through judicial proceedings is not the sort of 'public contro-
versy' referred to in Gertz .... ." Id. at 454. The Court also ruled that while Cox
Broadcasting had given the press an absolute privilege to report truthfully and accurately
judicial proceedings, no such privilege extended to inaccurate and defamatory reports, and
defendants could be held to a standard of due care. Id. at 457.
102. See, e.g., Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEX. L. REv. 422 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Anderson]; Brosnahan, From Times v. Sullivan to Gertz v. Welch: Ten
Years of Balancing Libel Law and the First Amendment, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 777 (1975); Eaton,
supra, note 19. But see Robertson, Defamation and the First Amendment: In Praise of Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 54 TEx. L. REv. 199 (1976).
103. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 343 (1974).
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liability," 4 the news media,'"5 and media.' ° The Court reinforced
this assumption by reiterating the language in Firestone.'"7 Whether
the same limitation was intended in New York Times is not clear.
Regardless of the Court's specific intent, the question remains: is a
distinction between media and non-media defendants warranted?
Justice Stewart has asserted that the distinction is justified given
the "freedom of the press" clause of the first amendment. 08 He
suggested that:
[Tihe Court's approach to [freedom of the press] cases has
uniformly reflected its understanding that the Free Press guar-
antee is, in essence, a structural provision of the Constitution
• . . [extending] protection to an institution. The publishing
business is, in short, the only organized private business that
is given explicit constitutional protection.'
Stewart conceives of the press as a fourth estate, which exists apart
from the government as a check on the three official branches,"0 and
thus a watchdog overseeing the conduct of public officials.
The theory is too narrow, however, since it cannot explain govern-
mental licensing and regulation of the electronic media."' More
important, the fourth estate rationale does not justify the Gertz
elimination of common law strict liability for defamation of private
individuals; the watchdog function of the press is operative only as
to government actions. Furthermore, limiting the New York Times
protection to media defendants makes no sense in the case of public
officials, the persons whom the fourth estate is supposed to watch;
104. Id. at 353 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
105. Id. at 355 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 362 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice White, while referring to "the press and
others," id. at 389, 392, may still have perceived the majority opinion to reach only media
defendants. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 263 (White, J.,
concurring).
107. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 449 (1976). The Court referred to "an uninhibited
press," id. at 456; to "publisher," id. at 458; "publisher or broadcaster,' id. at 464 & n.1
(Powell, J., concurring); and "press and broadcast media," id. at 465.
108. Justice Stewart referred to the factual situations in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323 (1974), Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm.,
412 U.S. 94 (1973), New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (the Pentagon
Papers case), and Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
109. Stewart, supra note 54, at A-20.
110. Id.
111. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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non-media speakers can also serve as watchdogs."' Finally, a first
amendment theory committed to wide-open debate on public issues
cannot tolerate granting immunity to a newspaper that unknow-
ingly published false statements about a candidate, while punishing
an individual at a political rally who makes the same, innocent
mistake."' The fourth estate theory is too mechanical and mono-
lithic to be useful in balancing legitimate interests, and could be
exceedingly dangerous in its application."'
A functional analysis not tied to a "structural" constitutional
theory, however, has been offered as justification for distinguishing
between media and non-media speakers." 5 Factors unique to the
media speaker compel greater protection."' Because of their corpo-
rate and financial structure, publishers and broadcasters are more
lucrative targets for defamation actions."' Non-media speakers,
usually lacking sources of vast funds, are frequently ignored by
plaintiffs."' However, this "vulnerability factor" does not justify
112. See Davis v. Schuchat, 510 F.2d 731, 734 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
113. See Eaton, supra note 19, at 1406.
114. Hunsaker, supra note 94, at 3.
115. At common law, the media enjoyed less protection under the privileges available to
it than non-media speakers. Both the fair comment and record libel privileges, which were
frequently used by the media, could be defeated either by proving misstatement of fact, see
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 606, 611, Comment d (1938), or a showing of malicious purpose,
see RESTATEMENT OF T6RTs § 594, Comment a (1938). The privilege most often available to
non-media speakers; protecting self or others interests, tolerated misstatements of fact if
made reasonably and in good faith, and could be defeated only by a showing of malice. See
F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 5.27, at 453 (1956).
"The interest-duty privileges were used primarily by non-media speakers because the
speaker was required to have some official or personal relationship with the recipient and not
simply be an officious intermeddler. In most cases a newspaper could not establish this
required relationship .... ." Note, First Amendment Protection Against Libel Actions:
Distinguishing Media and Non-Media Defendants, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 902, 910 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Distinguishing Defendants]. Further, the privilege could be defeated
by excessive publication, a circumstance which the media could seldom avoid unless the
interest sought to be protected was that of the entire community. See Jones, Interest and
-Duty in Relation to a Qualified Privilege, 22 MIcH. L. REv. 437, 439 (1924).
116. See Distinguishing Defendants, supra note 115, at 932-36.
117. In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, the jury awarded Butts over $3,000,000; it was later
reduced by remittur to $460,000. 380 U.S. at 138.
118. See Distinguishing Defendants, supra note 115, at 932 & n.169' But see Rosenblatt
v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968); Henry v. Collins,
253 Miss. 34, 158 So.2d 28 (1963), rev'd per curiam, 380 U.S. 356 (1965) (individual speaker,
rather than the medium in which the defamation appeared, was the defendant). There were
also a number of individual defendants in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
One solution might be to place statutory ceilings on amounts which can be recovered. This
is an idea which is gaining increasing credibility in other areas of tort law such as medical
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distinguishing the media from any other non-media defendant with
large assets.
Since the communications industry collects and disseminates in-
formation on a regular basis, it is impractical if not impossible for
the media gatekeepers to check thoroughly all the information col-
lected,"' especially for items regarded as "hot news."'120 The non-
media defendant, however, has greater opportunities and more time
to verify the accuracy of reports. Defamatory falsehoods published
by the media are usually innocent or inadvertent mistakes, rather
than malicious or intentional deception; the reverse is more likely
to be true for non-media defendants.' 2 1
The difficulty, therefore, is not in distinguishing between media
and non-media defendants; rational reasons exist for according dif-
malpractice, no-fault auto insurance, etc. Another possibility is to limit damages to "actual
injury" which "must be supported by competent evidence." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. at 350. Plaintiffs who can prove "actual malice" under the Times rule, however, may
be entitled to recover presumed and punitive damages. Id. at 349-50.
119. On a metropolitan afternoon paper there is a very large gross intake of words
and stories, just for the regional and national news, of over 400,000 words and 2,500
different news items, coming from 22 teletype machines most of which operate 24 hours
a day. The paper used 40,000 words in 300 items. This is not counting information
coming in for special departments like sports and financial. . . . The initial yes-no
decision on the 2,500 stories with 400,000 words is made by three men ... [who]
discard 90 percent of the incoming stories . . . .Discarded stories took from one to
two seconds of reading each . . . .On stories selected for use . . .(read, decide to use
it, and indicate the changes [to be] made), [tihe average for observed gatekeepers
was about six seconds per story . . . .Whatever values the gatekeeper brings to these
decisions he brings by reflex.
B. BAGDIKIAN, THE INFORMATION MACHINES 102-03 (1971).
120. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 415 F.2d 892, 895-96 (3d Cir. 1969), aff'd, 403 U.S.
29, 46 (1971).
Objectivity is affected not so much by mutual adjustments in rhythm and tempo
between the media and the actors in the drama of public affairs as it is by the
easy-often lazy-assumption adopted by journalists that their breathless journalism
is adequate to the communication of public affairs. It is the indiscriminate application
of speed and the forcing of all public Affairs, no matter how complex, obscure, and
developmental they may be, into the mold of instant journalism that threatens objec-
tivity.
McDonald, supra note 34, at 79.
121. See Distinguishing Defendants, supra note 115, at 934-35. However, when defama-
tion by non-media defendants is innocent,
[i]mposition of strict liability upon individuals who are apt to be both less circum-
spect in their name-calling and less aware of the risk of liability and thus less likely to
insure against it, seems to make less sense as a matter of tort law than imposing strict
liability upon large enterprises whose daily operations pose a substantial risk of pre-
dictable harm.
Eaton, supra note 19, at 1418.
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ferent rights in defamation law. The difficulty lies in justifying the
distinction in specific cases and in terms of constitutional law:
[T]he traditional doctrine [is] that liberty of the press is the
right of the lonely pamphleteer who uses carbon paper or a
mimeograph just as much as of the large metropolitan pub-
lisher who utilizes the latest photocomposition methods ....
The informative function . . . of the organized press . . . is
also performed by lecturers, political pollsters, novelists, aca-
demic researchers, and dramatists. Almost any author may
quite accurately assert that he is contributing to the flow of
information to the public .... ,12
Eaton has suggested a public speech/private speech distinction
rather than the media/non-media approach of Gertz.' 21 While ad-
mitting that a distinction between public and private speech would
be more difficult to draw, he believes that once drawn, it would be
consonant with the purposes of the first amendment enunciated in
Times. 1
24
Although Gertz apparently drew a distinction between media and
non-media defendants, neither the distinction, nor the rationale is
presently clear. Whether Justice Stewart's "fourth estate" theory
will prevail or whether the distinction will be lost and negligence or
a higher fault standard will be adopted by state courts for media
and non-media defendants alike remains to be seen.
B. Negligence and Self-Censorship
Admittedly, the Supreme Court's decisions in New York Times
and its progeny were an attempt to ameliorate the problems of press
self-censorship. Professor Anderson has suggested, however, that
the Gertz rules will exacerbate the problem:'2 5
122. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704-05 (1972) (citations omitted). Eaton has
collected post-Gertz lower court cases which have attempted to distinguish between media
and non-media defendants. Eaton, supra note 19, at 1418 nn.279 & 281. Mercantile credit
reports as well as trade journals have been held to be non-media defendants. Id. at 1407 n.241,
1418 n.281.
123. Eaton, supra note 19, at 1408 & n.242, 1449-51.
124. Id. at 1408 (footnote omitted).
125. "By importing the vocabulary of negligence into defamation, Gertz threatens to
confuse further what already is one of the most complex areas of the law. Most importantly,




If the common law concept of negligence is applied to defama-
tion, the extent of a publisher's constitutional protection will
depend on a jury's relatively unfettered ex post facto appraisal
of his conduct, and since the publisher has no way of knowing
how large the jury will make the prohibited zone, he has no
choice but to steer wide of it. " '
Additionally, if "negligence" is to be used, it should refer to a failure
to adhere to a set of standards established by "responsible publish-
ers" 27 or some analogous group. "Knowing" or "reckless" publica-
tion of falsehood is a determination not dependent upon such a
standard. The effect of Gertz, argues Anderson, is to discriminate
unjustifiably against media which do not follow orthodox investiga-
tory or verification methods. 8 Because journalists themselves dis-
agree over what constitutes responsible journalism and the ethics of
various journalistic practices, 29 the Supreme Court will ultimately
have to establish the standards.'30
Moreover, asserts Anderson, since negligence is traditionally an
issue entrusted to the special competence of juries, a defendant may
have to undergo the expense of an entire trial only to be exonerated.
Due to the exorbitant costs involved in defending a libel suit, 3' the
relevant question becomes not whether a story is libelous, but
whether the subject is likely to sue, and if so, how much will it cost
to defend.'3 2
Justice White, however, is skeptical of the self-censorship effect.
126. Id. at 460-61.
127. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967)..
128. Anderson, supra note 102, at 453-55.
129. Id.
130. "The process has already begun. Justice Powell referred to the "reasonably prudent
care that a State may constitutionally demand of a publisher or broadcaster prior to a
publication whose content reveals its defamatory potential," in suggesting that "[t]here was
substantial evidence, much of it uncontradicted, that the editors of Time exercised considera-
ble care in checking the accuracy of the story prior to its publication." Time, Inc. v. Firestone,
424 U.S. 448, 465-66 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
131. "The cost of defending a full-fledged libel suit probably begins at about $20,000 and
can run much higher; the successful defense of Rosenbloom is reported to have cost nearly
$100,000." Anderson, supra note 102, at 435-36 (footnotes omitted).
132. Id. at 425. This view parallels that of Justice Brennan who argued: "It is not simply
the possibility of a judgment for damages that results in self-censorship. The very possibility
of having to engage in litigation, an expensive and protracted process, is threat enough to
cause discussion and debate to 'steer far wider of the unlawful zone' thereby keeping pro-
tected discussion from public cognizance." Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52-
53 (1971) (Brennan, J.).
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In concurring in the judgment of Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,'33
he declared that self-censorship had not caused the press to become
overly cautious when reporting news concerning private citizens.
Justice Harlan, dissenting in Rosenbloom, similarly rejected con-
siderations of self-censorship. He argued that the press is a business
just as any other, and its function of gathering and reporting infor-
mation does not confer special immunization from the application
of general laws.'34 All members of our society must act reasonably if
their actions might produce adverse consequences to others.' Fur-
ther, Justice Harlan could find no serious first amendment prob-
lems in requiring publishers to compensate victims of negligent def-
amations if the standard were adjusted to take account of the coun-
tervailing interests in an open exchange of ideas. 3'
The cost of potential litigation is a factor which the publisher
must consider whatever standard is employed. Whether the defen-
dant knew or entertained serious doubts about a falsehood is a fac-
tual issue which may be even more difficult to determine as a matter
of law than a question of reasonable conduct. A negligence standard,
therefore, is not likely to pose a greater barrier to summary judge-
ment for the defendant than existed with a knowing falsehood stan-
dard. One should also not lose sight of the value judgment made by
the Court in New York Times, and renewed in subsequent cases,
that not all self-censorship is bad. The need for society to receive
information which is true and accurate is a countervailing goal,
requiring disseminators to exercise due care in the reporting of infor-
mation.
C. Private Individuals and the Public Interest
Perhaps the greatest criticism of the Gertz decision is that the
common law distinction between public figures and private individ-
uals, which the decision constitutionalized, is artificial and unre-
lated to the interests and values the first amendment is intended
to serve. Justice Brennan criticized this distinction in his plurality
opinion in Rosenbloom;137 he reasoned that the Times standard was
applied to libel of a public official or public figure to encourage
ventilation of public issues, and not because the public official has
any less interest in protecting his reputation than an individual in
133. 403 U.S. 29, 60 (1971) (White, J., concurring).
134. Id. at 67 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 70 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 67 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
137. 403 U.S. 45-46 (1970) (ibrennan, J.)
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private life.'38 Justice Brennan believed that if ventilation of public
issues was an important objective of the first amendment, and this
could hardly be denied, the scope of the amendment's protection
should not be limited to purely political expression,'39 with the state
free to punish or permit all other speech. The Supreme Court had
recognized in Thornhill v. Alabama'"° that freedom of the press
facilitates self-government by providing needed information to the
public. This information should include categories of general con-
cern, beyond knowledge of the activities of public figures. The pub-
lic's primary interest, according to Justice Brennan, was in the issue
or event, rather than the participant's prior notoriety.'
The public interest formula proposed by Justice Brennan, how-
ever, is inadequate. The emphasis upon issues rather than partici-
pants is idealistic. The public is personality-oriented, and the
"who" of a news story is apt to be an important, if not determina-
tive, factor of public interest. More important, the formula in-
creases the problem of balancing first amendment rights against the
right to be free from- damaging falsehoods, since arguably all
human events are within the area of public concern.' 2 Extending
the Times standard to all statements "of public concern" would
prevent most plaintiffs from recovering, if not bringing an action;
protection against libel would be lost because of the difficulty of
proving knowing or reckless falsehood.' Conversely, if the courts
were to determine the appropriate subjects of public concern, they
would necessarily determine what information is relevant to self-
government. The danger such a doctrine portends for freedom of the
138. Id. at 46.
139. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967).
140. 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1939).
141. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 43 (1971). In a footnote, Justice Bren-
nan argues further that in Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), the public's
interest in the provocative speech given during the crisis at the University of Mississippi
"would certainly have been the same ... if the speaker had been an anonymous student and
not a well-known retired Army general." Id. at 43 n.11. This is not at all clear, and in other
cases, definitely untrue. To cite a recent example, if Elizabeth Ray had approached the
Washington Post with the story that she was having an affair with "John Doe," private citizen
and maintenance manager of a local department store, who had promised to try to get her a
job as a sales clerk, no one would have been interested. It was the fact that the alleged
relationship was with Congressman Hayes, a public figure in his own right, and that such
conduct by a public official was highly unethical, if not illegal, that aroused public interest.
142. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 79 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
143. "The number of plaintiffs who have successfully hurdled the actual malice barrier
in the decade since New York Times is small." Eaton, supra note 19, at 1375.
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press is apparent.' Self-government requires the free flow of infor-
mation which is truthful and accurate, but the public interest for-
mula, lacking logical or neutral boundaries, fails to insure the dis-
semination of truthful information. Beyond the need to balance first
amendment interests against other legitimate interests lies the need
to internally balance first amendment goals and policies, because
breathing space is useless in a poisonous atmosphere.
The Warren "power and influence over the decision making pro-
cess" formulation for public figures, however, does admit of logical
and neutral boundaries.' Furthermore, Justice Stone, in the 1938
decision of United States v. Carolene Products Co.,'46 propounded
a doctrine of judicial intervention into legislative activity, which
justifies greater protection for speech related to political activity.
The Court suggested that legislation which restricted those political
processes ordinarily expected to bring about repeal of undesirable
legislation would be subject to more exacting judicial scrutiny. '47
Professor Lusky'4s viewed this remark as a recognition by the Court
of its special responsibility for the political processes because, unless
some non-political agency intervened, interferences with the correc-
tive mechanism would perpetuate themselves.'49
The Carolene Products rationale,'50 therefore, provides a basis not
144. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 79 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
It was for this reason that Justice Marshall dissented in Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448
(1976). The majority, in ruling that Mrs. Firestone was not a public figure, stated that
dissolution of a marriage "is not the sort of 'public controversy' referred to in Gertz, even
though the marital difficulties of extremely wealthy individuals may be of interest to some
portion of the reading public." Id. at 454. In response, Justice Marshall stated that "[i]f
there is one thing that is clear from Gertz, it is that we explicitly rejected the position . . .
that the applicability of the New York Times standard depends upon whether the subject
matter of a report is a matter of 'public or general concern.' " Id. at 488 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
145. See notes 64-66, 99-101 and accompanying text supra.
146. 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938). The doctrine was propounded "with the casualness of a
footnote." See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See also
Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 600 (1940).
147. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Examples of
restrictive legislative areas included "the right to vote," "the dissemination of information,"
"interferences with political organizations," and "peaceable assembly." The footnote went
on to suggest that similar considerations apply when legislation is directed at "discrete and
insular minorities."
148. Professor Lusky of Columbia Law School was clerk to Justice Stone in 1938.
149. Lusky, Minority Rights and the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J., 20, 20-21 (1942).
150. Unfortunately, most of the discussion and controversy over the footnote has been
centered on the first paragraph-the so-called "preferred position" doctrine, while the more
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only for distinguishing between public and private figures, but for
preferring that approach over one of public versus private interest.
Both public officials who have "responsibility for or control over the
conduct of governmental affairs,"'' and public figures who "play an
influential role in ordering society,"' 52 possess political power to
make major decisions and to constrain the effectiveness of
"correctives" against the abuse of power. For them, the libel suit is
a powerful weapon against the processes which normally repeal un-
just laws, remove corrupt public officials, and "neutralize" overly
influential public figures.'53 The law of defamation becomes an in-
strument of control and not a vehicle to vindicate personal reputa-
tion. Consequently, when the exercise of the first amendment rights
of freedom of press and freedom of speech are directed toward the
conduct of public officials and public figures, greater judicial pro-
tection is required. The justification is lacking, however, when pri-
vate individuals are defamed, whether or not in the context of
"matters of public or general concern."' 54
Nevertheless, the Carolene Products rationale does not prohibit
greater expansion of first amendment protection. The Court, for
reasons such as procedural convenience or the need for simplicity
or facilitation of its overseer functions, might have chosen to expand
first amendment protection. The Court, however, has not yet done
so, and good reasons exist for the path it has chosen.
logical "central meaning" rationale provided in the second and third paragraphs has received
little attention.
151. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966) (Warren, C.J., concurring).
152. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967).
153. Concededly, this is similar to Justice Stewart's "watchdog" theory of the free press
clause. The key difference is that the Court, neither in Carolene Products nor in New York
Times, perceived the "watchdog" function to be the exclusive province of the organized press.
See note 122 and accompanying text supra. Nor should the function of the press be viewed
exclusively as watchdog of the government as Mr. Justice Stewart contends. "A stance of
'pure' opposition-opposition as an end in itself, rather than as an expression of some larger,
positive political commitment-is self-contradictory in theory and likely to be short-lived in
practice. The probability is that an adversary press would eventually ally itself with a politi-
cal faction and so become partisan-an ideologically divisive factor rather than a politically
unifying force. The consequences could be enormous." Weaver, The New Journalism and the
Old, reprinted in ETHICS AND THE PRESS, supra note 2, at 105-06.
154. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 44 (1971) (Brennan, J.) The conclusion
by the Court in Gertz thus takes on added significance: "[P]rivate individuals are not only
more vulnerable to injury than public officials and public figures; they are also more deserv-
ing of recovery." 418 U.S. at 345.
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III. THE NECESSITY FOR BALANCING FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY
In an ideal world, the responsibility of the press would match
the freedom and public trust given it.'
A. The Growing Issue of Press Credibility
Professor Anderson noted that the Times privilege has had little
effect in preventing defamation actions from being filed or ap-
pealed.' In 1963, a year before the Times decision, 87 appellate
decisions in libel cases were reported. In 1973, the number had risen
to 117.57 As many as 1100 libel suits have been filed against newspa-
pers alone between 1963 and 1974, an increase of several hundred
per cent since the late 1950's. 111 Given the trend toward "advocacy
journalism" during the same period, one inference to be drawn from
the statistical increase in libel suits is that the media are making
more libelous statements.'
The increase in libel suits, whether or not induced by the Times
decision, is indicative of an increasing questioning of the credibility
of the news media. Several factors, besides the greater protection
afforded the press by decisions such as New York Times, account
for this concern. What is probably the major reason was noted by
the Supreme Court in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo:
"Chains of newspapers, national newspapers, national wire and
news services and one-newspaper towns, are the dominant features
of a press that has become noncompetitive and enormously powerful
and influential in its capacity to manipulate popular opinion and
change the course of events."' 160
155. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 51 (1971) (Brennan, J.)
156. Anderson, supra note 102, at 424-25.
157. Id. at 430 n.43.
158. 4 More 6 (Sept. 1974).
159. Cf. Stein, The Muckraking Book in America, 1946-1973, 52 JOURNALISM Q. 297 (1975):
"Since the mid-1960's, muckraking has had an important resurgence in the United States.
Through numerous outlets it has reached highly receptive publics." Thus, while Anderson
contends that New York Times did not reduce the threat of libel suits and therefore, self-
censorship, he seems to assume that media reporting behavior and content has not changed,
accounting for .the increase in lawsuits.
160. 418 U.S. 241, 249 (1974). Consider the newspaper industry: By 1972, more than 150
national and regional chains owned nearly half of American dailies and 65% of total daily
circulation. The ten largest groups held one third of total American circulation. Baer,
Concentration of Mass Media Ownership: Assessing the State of Current Knowledge 35-43,
RAND CoaP. REP. No. R-1584-HSF, Sept. 1974. In 1910, there were 2,442 dailies in the United
States which competed with each other in 689 cities; in 1970 the total was down to 1,748 with
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Increased monopolization of the press has brought it more power
to control and influence political decision-making. Empirical stud-
ies indicate: (1) that chain newspapers are more likely to make
political editorial endorsements, and that the endorsements are
homogenous within the chain; 6' (2) that editorial endorsements
have a significant influence on the political process, particularly
among independents, and on the selection of state and local candi-
dates;6 ' and (3) that noncompeting newspapers making editorial
endorsements of political candidates give biased coverage of that
candidate. 3
Decreasing competition, however, has not eliminated the incen-
tive to publish potentially libelous material as a means of economic
survival.'64 In concurring with the judgment in Butts, Chief Justice
effective competition in only 42 cities. Note, Media and the First Amendment in a Free
Society, 60 GEO. L.J. 867, 892-93 (1972).
161. Wackman, Chain Newspaper Autonomy as Reflected in Presidential Campaign
Endorsements, 52 JOURNALISM Q. 411 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Wackman]. "In all four
elections [1960, 1964, 1968 and 1972)] . . . 85% or more of the [chain] papers endorsing a
candidate supported the same candidate . . . . Clearly these data run counter to the insist-
ence of chain spokesmen that their endorsement policies are independent from chain direc-
tion." Id. at 419. In 1972 nearly 75% of the chains, and 85% or more of the papers within each
chain, endorsed Richard M. Nixon. Id. at 418.
162. See Gregg, Newspaper Editorial Endorsements and California Elections, 1948-62, 42
JOURNALISM Q. 532 (1965); McCombs, Editorial Endorsements: A Study of Influence, 44
JOURNALISM Q. 545 (1967); Robinson, The Press As King-Maker: What Surveys from the Last
Five Campaigns Show, 51 JOURNALISM Q. 587 (1974). Some of the unsettling implications of
these findings are posed by Wackman:
[In those elections where one candidate is heavily favored by the media, it may be
that newspaper endorsements strongly influence the size of the favored candidate's
majority. In part this may explain the overwhelming victories of President Johnson in
1964 and President Nixon in 1972. Could it also be that this phenomenon gives the
winning candidate a somewhat distorted image of a mandate? Seen in the context of
the homogeneity of chains, if one or two members of a chain switch, are all likely to?
Does this help to facilitate an enormous electoral victory-and a false notion about a
national mandate? Did this notion about an overwhelming mandate, perhaps influ-
enced by a homogenous chain-owned press, affect the behavior of the winners? Both
Johnson and Nixon, for example, behaved as though they had a strong mandate to
carry out their programs, yet both left office as singularly unpopular presidents.
Wackman, supra note 161, at 420. One further speculation might be entertained: but for
chain-newspaper endorsements would there have been a Vietnam or a Watergate?
163. Wilhoit & Auh, Newspaper Endorsement and Coverage of Public Opinion Polls in
1970, 51 JOURNALISM Q. 654 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Wilhoit & Auh].
164. Anderson asserts that: "[Elven where competition exists, little can be gained by
taking chances. Publishers and broadcasters gain or lose their audiences for reasons that are
unrelated to boldness or timidity of their journalism." Anderson, supra note 102, at 433. But
see Wilhoit & Auh, supra note 163.
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Warren noted that an editorial decision had been made to change
the image of the Saturday Evening Post. In hope that circulation
would be increased, the magazine would begin a program of sophis-
ticated muckraking. 65
At the same time, close affiliation between a newspaper and a
candidate for political office might provide incentive for defama-
tion. In Sprouse v. Clay Communication, Inc., 6' the Supreme Court
of Appeals of West Virginia upheld a lower court finding that a
newspaper had conspired with a candidate for governor to destroy
the character of the opposing candidate.' 7 Finally, Epstein has ob-
served that "the logic of daily journalism often impels immediate
publication which, though it might result in a prized 'scoop,' di-
vorces the journalist from responsibility for the veracity or conse-
quences of the disclosure."' 68
The result of increasing media power and aggressiveness has been
the widening of a credibility gap, attested to by persons inside and
outside the media. Katharine Graham, publisher of the Washington
Post, admitted that not only are the American people not satisfied
with their press, but that the nation's publishers are acutely aware
of the general indictment.' 9 As Michael Novak recently observed,
"[tihose in the national media who hoped to develop a public more
critical about its government, its merchants and its corporations
have also made the people cynical about the press."'7 0
165. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 169 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring).
166. 211 S.E.2d 674 (W.Va.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 991 (1975).
167. Id. at 674.
168. ETHICS AND THE PRESS, supra note 2, at 66. "Jack Anderson was thus able to explain
a blatantly false report about the arrest for drunken driving of Sen. Thomas Eagleton, then
Vice Presidential nominee of the Democratic Party, by saying that if he had delayed publica-
tion to check the allegation he would have risked being scooped by competitors." Id.
169. Quoted in A FREE AND RESPONSIVE PRESS: THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE
REPORT FOR A NATIONAL NEWS COUNCIL 3 (1972). [hereinafter cited as A FREE AND RESPONSIVE
PRESS]. According to public opinion polls, while 48% of the public sampled considered televi-
sion news to be the most believable, only 21% of the respondents considered newspapers to
be the most credible. B. ROPER, WHAT PEOPLE THINK OF TELEVISION AND OTHER MASS MEDIA,
1959-1972 (1972). Nevertheless, 42% of the general public and 53% of the college educated
believed television news gave slanted or distorted coverage of political and social issues. AIPO
Poll, Jan. 15, 1970. Similarly, one study of a California city found that respondents dis-
counted on the average one-third of what they read in the newspapers and one-fifth of what
they saw on television. J. LYLE, THE NEWS IN MEGALOPOLIS 39-42 (1967). See also LeRoy &
Smith, Perceived Ethicality of Some TV News Production Techniques by a Sample of Florida
Legislators, 40 SPEECH MONOGRAPHS 326 (1973).
170. Novak, Why the Working Man Hates the Media, reprinted in ETHICS AND THE PRESS,
supra note 2, at 108-09.
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In response to growing public distrust of the media, the Twentieth
Century Fund, in 1975, established a National News Council (NNC)
composed of fifteen members drawn from the press and the public
at large.' 7 ' Even before the Council was established, Justice Bren-
nan in Gertz had proposed a national news council as a means of
press self-evaluation.'72 Investigation reveals, however, that the
Council has not accomplished its purpose.
The creation of an independent agency' "to appraise and report
annually upon the performance of the press" was initially met by
journalists with uniform hostility,"' and even though a council has
finally been established, major opposition still exists.' This opposi-
tion is critical, since the Council is dependent upon the media to
publish or broadcast its findings. "' Limited funding and low visibil-
ity also prevent the NNC from effectively maintaining media credi-
bility.'77 Further, its limited purposes of appraising and reporting
prevent it from solving the problem of press credibility.'78 Finally,
the solution appears to be no more effective than measures which
could be taken by defamed individuals themselves; publication of
a correction or retraction is dependent upon the editorial policy of
the newspaper, whether the request for the right of reply or retrac-
tion comes from the individual or the National News Council.'79
171. National News Council, IN THE PUBLIC INTERESTS 13 (1975). See also A FREE AND
RESPONSIVE PRESS, supra note 169.
172. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 365 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
173. The Hutchin's Commission on Freedom of the Press was first proposed in 1947. A
FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS: A GENERAL REPORT ON MASS COMMUNICATION: NEWSPAPERS,
RADIO, MOTION PICTURES, MAGAZINES, AND BOOKS, at v (1947) [hereinafter cited as A FREE AND
RESPONSIBLE PRESS].
174. Isaacs estimates that at least 95% of the nation's publishers bitterly rejected and
villified the Commission's Report. Isaacs, Why We Lack A National Press Council, reprinted
in MASS MEDIA AND COMMUNICATION 593 (2 ed. C. Steinberg 1972).
175. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE TO EVALUATE THE NATIONAL NEWS COUNCIL 5 (1976).
176. W. DICKENSON, EDITORIAL RESEARCH REPORTS 469 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
DICKENSON].
177. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE TO EVALUATE THE NATIONAL NEWS COUNCIL 5 (1976).
178. Since its functions are limited to investigating and reporting complaints of inaccu-
racy and unfairness only in national sources of news, "[t]he Council is not a panacea for
the ills of the press or a court weighing complaints about the responsibility of the press." A
FREE AND RESPONSIVE PRESS, supra note 169, at 2.
179. It should also be noted that the "Personal Attack Rule" under the FCC's Fairness
Doctine, whereby an individual maligned may be.afforded the right of reply, is severely
restricted in scope and application, and is no real substitute for either the vindication of
reputation or a vehicle for maintaining media credibility. See, e.g., Healy v. FCC, 460 F.2d
917 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Straus Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 530 F.2d 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
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B. Press Credibility and the Central Meaning of the First
Amendment
The decline in credibility of the news media is not a minor prob-
lem which is likely to be resolved by "independent" press councils.
Its consequences are significant, and pose a major threat to the
purposes of the first amendment. If the public distrusts the media,
it will not use the information that the media disseminates. While
this alone frustrates the goal of uninhibited debate, the greater
harm occurs when the public substitutes, for the information it was
receiving from the press, information from their friends, neighbors,
or worse, from their own imaginations. 80
Demands for governmental control would become hard to resist
as press irresponsibility reaches this point. As early as 1947, the
Commission on Freedom of the Press predicted that the American
democracy will not indefinitely tolerate concentrations of media
power which become irresponsible and strong enough to thwart the
aspirations of the people, and the government would eventually be
used to break up power.' 8' If this prospect seems far-fetched, one
need only recall the public reaction to Vice-President Agnew's
speech in 1969 concerning television news bias and the need for
comprehensive control of the media. Senators and Congressmen,
responsive to their constituents' anger, called for licensing of jour-
nalists and for creation of government-sponsored watchdog councils
to require newspapers to present conflicting views on issues of public
importance, to require newspapers to print all advertisements sub-
180. Baker, Task Force Report on Mass Media and Violence, National Commission on the
Causes and Prevention of Violence, reprinted in ETmICS AND THE PRESS, supra note 2, at 182-
83. See also G. ALLPORT & L. POSTMAN, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RUMOR (1947); T. SHIBUTANI,
IMPROVISED NEWS: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF RUMOR (1966).
When the public does not believe the information they receive from the news media
or thinks the media are omitting important facts, there will be increased reliance on
less formal sources for information. Ordinarily, this means they ask their friends and
neighbors, or worse, they supply the information from their own imaginations. The
consequences of such a breakdown of formal channels of communication can be very
serious . . . .[Ailmost any after-action report on the recent civil disorders will con-
firm that rumors run rampant during periods of great stress and almost invariably
involve gross exaggerations . . . . The direction of distortion of information received
through informal communication is almost invariably toward the group's preconcep-
tions.
Baker, Task Force Report on Mass Media and Violence, National Commission on the Causes
and Prevention of Violence, reprinted in ETHICS AND THE PRESS, supra note 2, at 182-83.
181. A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS, supra note 173.
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mitted, to empower the FCC to enforce the Fairness Doctrine on
newspapers, and to create a right of reply for any organization or
individual made the subject of an editorial comment by a newspa-
per. 182
The progressive effects of press irresponsibility, therefore, are the
decline of credibility and public trust, subsequent reliance on rumor
and distorted information, and finally, demands for greater govern-
ment control and regulation. Whether first amendment purposes
and values are viewed narrowly or broadly, press irresponsibility has
a devastating effect. Under the narrower Carolene Products ap-
proach, the news media can only keep the corrective political mech-
anisms free from restraint and interference by public officials and
public figures if it is a credible source. The public must have confid-
ence that reports of bad laws, corrupt officials, and manipulative
public figures are accurate, if it is to act on the reports and make
the government more responsive to human needs."8 3 Under the
broader "self-governance" rationale articulated in Thornhill v.
Alabama, ,81 press credibility is still crucial. If the public distrusts
the media as a source of information, it will not act on that informa-
tion as a means of self-governance.
182. A FREE AND RESPONSIVE PRESS, supra note 169, at 2-3. Commenting on the recent
substitution of a "subjective" for the traditional "objective" definition of responsibility,
Journalism Professor Emeritus J. Edward Gerald asserted:
The two definitions represent precisely opposed professional positions which may be
likened to democratic and authoritarian governments. In one the official and the
journalist, although they have clear roles to play, are responsive to the people and can
be rewarded or punished by them. In the other, particularly in this age of mass commu-
nication, the people are responsive to the journalist and he will lead them according
to that gutsy feeling he has about men and issues. The only way the people can correct
or change the gutsy journalist is by revolution-the alteration or destruction of the
privately-owned mass communication system.
Gerald, Truth and Error-Journalism's Tournament of Reason, reprinted in, ETHICS AND THE
PRESS, supra note 2, at 138.
183. For example, a non-credible press would have failed to convince the American public
of the abuses of power and usurpation of liberties by the Nixon administration. Watergate
would have been regarded (and for a while, was so regarded) as just one more example of
distorted, sensationalized journalism. President Nixon and his staff made every effort to
discredit the news media reporting of the unfolding of the Watergate affair as "outrageous,
vicious, distorted reporting." See C. BERNSTEIN & B. WoODwARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN
168-77, 208-211, 297 (Warner Books ed. 1975). While undoubtedly, most of the reporting was
"responsible," a complete and accurate account of Watergate may never be available. After
investigating Nixon's charges of "outrageous" and "distorted" reporting, the National News
Council determined on May 14, 1974 that it was impossible to get to the truth of the matter.
DICKENSON, supra note 176, at 454.
184. 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940).
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CONCLUSION: FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY IN THE OPEN SOCIETY
Accountability, like subjection to law, is not necessarily a net
subtraction from liberty . . . . The First Amendment was in-
tended to guarantee free expression, not to create a privileged
industry. 15
In an era of increasing power of mass communication, increasing
sophistication and mechanisms of exploitation and manipulation of
public opinion, and increasing wariness and cynicism by the public
of the mass media, the need for accountability has become acute.
Industry self-regulation, even if agreed to, will not maintain credi-
bility; the National News Council does not have the resources,
scope, or support to make more than isolated inquiries into alleged
media irresponsibility.
Government regulation, on the other hand, has been somewhat
successful in protecting the public from false and misleading adver-
tising, with legislation requiring truth in packaging and full disclo-
sure of securities transactions. Regulation, however, has failed to
produce "fairness" in electronic journalism."' 8 Furthermore, little
has been or can be done to fragment large ownership concentrations
of broadcasting or newspaper outlets. For example, the FCC rules
concerning diversification of media ownership are frequently re-
laxed where a licensee has a good program record,'87 and the current
cross-media ownership regulations do not attempt to separate exist-
ing newspaper-broadcasting combinations."' Even the anti-trust
laws are circumvented, since Congress has exempted newspapers
from their full impact.'89 Beyond the limitations of government-
induced accountability, however, are the dangers, inherent in
government regulation, of censorship and suppression which the
first amendment was adopted to prevent.190
185. A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS, supra note 173, at 81, 130.
186. It should be noted that "guaranteed" access to either broadcasting or newspapers has
received little or no support from the Court. See CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm. 412 U.S.
94 (1973); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
187. See Comparative Hearings Involving Renewal Applicants, 22 F.C.C.2d 424, 18
P&F Radio Reg.2d 1901, 1907 (1970).
188. Newspaper-Broadcast Cross-Ownership, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046, 32 P&F Radio Reg.2d 954
(1975).
189. 15 U.S.C. § 1803 (1970).
190. Cf. Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 63-80 (1972) (D.C. Cir.
1972) (Bazelon, C.J. dissenting). Government regulations on the media are constantly suscep-
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The common law action for defamation thus remains the most
effective check on media irresponsibility, and is the greatest safe-
guard against loss of credibility in the press. Unlike press boards
and government regulatory agencies, the libel action is available to
any citizen who believes and can prove his reputation has been
damaged by a negligently published falsehood. The issue is tried in
his community by a jury of his peers, with the normal safeguards
against an unjust verdict available to the defendant.
Although the role of libel law in the system of freedom of expres-
sion has been "relatively minor and essentially erratic," ' its role
in perpetuating trust in the media is significant. '92 Knowing that the
libel suit stands as a check against falsehood and damaging inaccu-
racy, the private citizen is able to place his faith more completely
in the truthfulness of news media reports on which he may be totally
dependent for knowledge. While it would be hyperbole to state that
only the common law of defamation stands between the current
concern over media credibility and the collapse of the privately
owned mass communication system, the need to restore faith both
in government and the media remains critical, and the availability
of a private remedy against media abuses will play a substantial role
in restoring and maintaining that faith.
The United States Supreme Court has sensed these concerns and
has refused to expand the New York Times privilege to an elusive
standard of "public interest." Whether by its decision to eliminate
strict liability it has given with one hand and taken away with the
other, as argued by Justice White, remains to be seen. What has not
tible to the charge of inhibiting freedom of expression. See, e.g., Hon. Harley 0. Staggers, 30
F.C.C.2d 150, 21 P&F Radio Reg.2d 912 (1971) (Selling of the Pentagon); Rogers & Cleven-
ger, Jr., The Selling of the Pentagon: "Was CBS the Fullbright Propaganda Machine?", 47
Q. J. of Speech 266 (1971); Atlanta NAACP, 36 F.C.C.2d 635 (1972) (J.B. Stoner case);
Brandywine Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 63-80 (1972) (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Baze-
Ion, C.J., dissenting); D. Bazelon, FCC Regulation of the Telecommunications Press, 1975
DUKE L.J. 213; Report on Fairness Doctrine, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 30 P&F Radio Reg.2d 1261 (1974).
191. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 519 (1970).
192. Lippmann noted:
[Ejach of us tends to judge a newspaper, if we judge it at all, by its treatment of that
part of the news in which we feel ourselves involved. The newspaper deals with a
multitude of events beyond our experience. But it deals also with some events within
our experience. And by its handling of those events, we most frequently decide to like
it or dislike it, to trust it or refuse to have the sheet in the house.
LIPPMAN, supra note 1, at 208.
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yet been recognized, however, and what must now be vehemently
stressed, is that only a finite amount of "breathing space" is avail-
able to the media under the first amendment. Beyond that limit lies
a "poisonous atmosphere" of lies, distortion, distrust, and disillu-
sion capable of bringing down both the press and the open society
which it serves. Although the turbulence of Vietnam, violent pro-
test, and Watergate has subsided, we continue to push against those
outer limits.
